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Energy-Efficient Wireless Powered Secure
Transmission with Cooperative Jamming for Public
Transportation
Linqing Gui, Feifei Bao, Xiaobo Zhou, Chunhua Yu, Feng Shu, and Jun Li
Abstract—In this paper, wireless power transfer and coopera-
tive jamming (CJ) are combined to enhance physical security in
public transportation networks. First, a new secure system model
with both fixed and mobile jammers is proposed to guarantee
secrecy in the worst-case scenario. All jammers are endowed
with energy harvesting (EH) capability. Following this, two CJ
based schemes, namely B-CJ-SRM and B-CJ-TPM, are proposed,
where SRM and TPM are short for secrecy rate maximization
and transmit power minimization, respectively. They respectively
maximize the secrecy rate (SR) with transmit power constraint
and minimize the transmit power of the BS with SR constraint,
by optimizing beamforming vector and artificial noise covariance
matrix. To further reduce the complexity of our proposed optimal
schemes, their low-complexity (LC) versions, called LC-B-CJ-
SRM and LC-B-CJ-TPM are developed. Simulation results show
that our proposed schemes, B-CJ-SRM and B-CJ-TPM, achieve
significant SR performance improvement over existing zero-
forcing and QoSD methods. Additionally, the SR performance
of the proposed LC schemes are close to those of their original
versions.
Index Terms—Energy harvesting, Physical layer security, Se-
crecy rate maximization, Transmit power minimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the sake of green communication, wireless devices are
urged to transmit with a very low power. However, due to
the broadcast nature of wireless signals, wireless information
is still vulnerable to eavesdroppers. Consequently, energy-
efficient secure communication has arisen to be an important
problem in wireless networks [1], [2]. In public places, since
eavesdroppers can easily hide themselves and are hard to
be distinguished, secure information is easy to be overheard
by the eavesdroppers and secure communication is difficult
to be guaranteed. Thus, this paper focuses on secure com-
munication issues in public places, especially in city public
transportation vehicles. For example, when a manager takes a
city train or light rail for one-hour business trip, he would
make the best use of the travel time to fulfill commercial
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tasks via wireless networks, including e-transaction, classified
file transfer and email transmission. Meanwhile, a commercial
spy/eavesdropper who is disguised as a passenger in the same
carriage can easily capture those wireless signals carrying
the sensitive information, which may cause huge loss to the
company as well as the individual. Therefore, when potential
eavesdroppers are detected, security techniques should be
employed immediately to protect information transmission.
To address this issue, apart from the traditional encryp-
tion techniques at the application layer, physical-layer (PHY)
security techniques dedicate to prevent eavesdroppers from
intercepting wireless messages, thus enhancing security from
the most bottom layer and from the first beginning. One
important performance criterion of PHY security is achievable
secrecy rate (SR) which is defined as the difference between
the transmission rate of the legitimate channel and that of
the wiretap channel [3]. Here the legitimate channel is the
channel between the transmission node and the intended
destination, while the wiretap channel is the channel between
the transmitter and the eavesdropper. A positive SR can be
achieved when the wiretap channel is worse than legitimate
channel. But if the SR is downgraded below zero, secure
transmission will not be guaranteed and the eavesdropper
may successfully capture confidential information. In order to
improve the secrecy performance of wireless communication
systems, many effective schemes have been proposed such
as artificial noise [2], [4], directional modulation (DM) [5],
[6] and cooperative jamming (CJ) [7]–[9]. Artificial noise is
often generated by the transmission node which is equipped
multiple antennas so that the noise can be steered to only
degrade the wiretap channel. The DM synthesis is achievable
by transmitting confidential messages directly towards the
desired receivers [5]. However, DM is not so feasible in the
scenario of city public transportation because it is technically
difficult for a remote Base Station (BS) to generate such
narrow beams to directionally distinguish the mobile nodes
in the same carriage of a public vehicle.
On the contrary, CJ is preferable in the concerned appli-
cation scenario because mobile devices carried by passengers
in the same vehicle are potentially helpful cooperative nodes.
The main idea of CJ is that all cooperative nodes assist the
transmitter in the secure transmission by generating artificial
noise signals to interfere with the eavesdropper. Although CJ
can enhance the SR by taking advantage of user cooperation,
the good performance is achieved with the help of cooperative
nodes which consume their energy to generate and transmit
2interference signals. One main obstacle that hinder the employ-
ment of CJ-based schemes is that cooperative nodes are usually
themselves energy starving, e.g., mobile users in the scenario
of this article. Therefore, it is critical to fully compensate
the energy consumption of cooperative nodes through energy
harvesting techniques.
Wireless energy harvesting is an emerging approach to
power the energy-constrained networks and help prolonging
the lifetime of wireless nodes [10], [11]. In recent works, radio
frequency (RF) energy harvesting techniques are separated
into two main families: simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) and wireless powered tranfer (WPT)
[12]. In SWIPT, the transmitted signals carry both energy
and information to contemporaneously achieve information
delivery and wireless energy recharging [13]. In contrast, WPT
divides wireless communication into two phases. The power
transfer phase first broadcasts energy-containing signals to
recharge the energy harvesting wireless nodes; then, these
nodes transmit packets by utilizing the harvested energy in the
previous phase. From the aspect of complexity, WPT is more
suitable than SWIPT in the scenario of this article because
the cooperative jammers only need the energy of radio signals
from power station and they have no interest in the content of
those signals.
Although either cooperative jamming or wireless power
transfer has been well studied in literature, it is in recent
years that their combination has become an attractive research
topic [14]–[17]. The authors in [14] proposed a hybrid base
station (BS) which first transfers power to the source and
then executes cooperative jamming while the source transmits
the information using the harvested energy. However, in the
scenario of public transportation, rather than the hybrid BS, it
is more reasonable to deploy a power station inside a vehicle
to wireless charge cooperative nodes, considering the long
distance between the BS and each cooperative node. The
wireless-powered network described in [15] assumed coop-
erative nodes to be untrusted. In that scenario, the cooperative
nodes also acted as relays, i.e., they need to relay the informa-
tion from the source. The secure network in [16] comprises
of one source, one jammer and one destination. The SR at
the destination is maximized by jointly optimizing the power
allocation on each subcarrier at the source and the jammer as
well as the time allocation between two time slots. In [17], the
authors provided an overview on cooperative jamming strate-
gies for wireless powered communication networks. Designed
for different application scenarios, those CJ strategies cannot
be directly employed in public transportation. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper investigating the PHY
security issue for public transportation. The main contributions
of this paper are summarized as follows:
(1) A cooperative jamming based secure communication
model with energy harvesting capability is established for
public transportation. In this model, cooperative jamming is
fulfilled by both fixed jammers and mobile jammers. The
fixed jamming nodes pre-installed in the vehicle can help to
guarantee basic secrecy performance in the worst-case scenario
with no mobile users in the vehicle. On the contrary, when
there are other mobile users in the vehicle, they can act as
mobile jammers to greatly interfere with the eavesdropper
and to maximize the SR. Since mobile jammers consume
their limited energy to transmit the interference signals, en-
ergy compensation is provided in the model through energy
harvesting.
(2) To obtain the best secrecy and power perfor-
mance, two CJ based optimal schemes are proposed,
namely beamforming-CJ-SR-maximization (B-CJ-SRM) and
beamforming-CJ-transmit-power-minimization (B-CJ-TPM).
These two schemes are designed to maximize the SR and
to minimize the transmit power of the BS, respectively. As
to B-CJ-SRM, with the constraint on the maximum signal-
to-interference-noise-ratio (SINR) of the eavesdropper, the
original optimization problem is first converted into a tractable
problem, then into a standard semidefinite programming (SDP)
problem by the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique. Sim-
ilarly, the original problem of B-CJ-TPM is also transformed
into a SDP which can be easily solved by CVX tools.
Simulation results show that our schemes have better secrecy
and power performance than some existing schemes such as
zero-forcing [8] and QoSD [18].
(3) Due to the relatively high complexity of the proposed
two optimal schemes, we then design two corresponding low-
complexity schemes, namely LC-B-CJ-SRM and LC-B-CJ-
TPM. These two schemes both employ concave convex proce-
dure (CCCP) iterative method to obtain sub-optimal solutions
of their original optimization. The main ideas of two proposed
low-complexity schemes are described as follows. First, the
optimization problem is transformed into an equivalent dif-
ference of convex (DC) programming. Then the CCCP-based
iterative method is employed to solve the DC programming.
During each iteration, only a second-order cone programming
(SOCP) needs to be solved. Finally the complexity of the two
proposed schemes are derived, proved to be much lower than
that of their original schemes. Simulation results show that
our low-complexity schemes have similar performance to our
optimal schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a
CJ based secure communication model with energy harvesting
capability is introduced. Section III describes our proposed
two CJ based schemes namely B-CJ-SRM and B-CJ-TPM. In
Section IV, to reduce the complexity of the proposed schemes,
we further design their low-complexity versions namely LC-
B-CJ-SRM and LC-B-CJ-TPM. Section V presents simulation
results to validate the effectiveness and advantage of the
proposed schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: In this paper, the lower-case, boldface lower-
case and boldface upper-case letters are used to denote scalars,
vectors and matrices, respectively. The transpose, conjugate,
conjugate transpose, rank and trace of the matrix X are
denoted as XT , X∗, XH , rank(X) and Tr(X), respectively.
X  0 denotes that X is Hermitian positive semidefinite
matrix. E{·} denotes expectation. CN{µ, σ2} denotes the cir-
cularly symmetric, complex Gaussian distribution with mean
µ and variance σ2. log{·} denotes the base-2 logarithm.
3II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a downlink secure commu-
nication system with one Base Station (BS), one destination
user, one eavesdropper, one power station and, totally N
cooperative nodes. Except the BS, all other nodes are deployed
in a public transportation vehicle. The destination user can
be actually a mobile user, who is a passenger in the vehicle.
The BS is equipped with M antennas and each of all other
users is equipped with a single antenna. The power station is
pre-installed in the vehicle for wirelessly transferring power
to the cooperative nodes. The cooperative nodes marked as
C1, C2, C3, . . . , CN are used to transmit jamming signals to
deliberately confuse the eavesdropper. We assume that, among
the total N cooperative nodes, the first two nodes are fixed
and pre-installed in the vehicle, while the remaining nodes are
mobile jamming nodes, which are actually mobile users (e.g.,
passengers). This assumption is to guarantee a certain level of
secrecy in the worst-case scenario, where there is no mobile
jamming node in the vehicle, which may happen during the
non-peak hours. In this worst-case scenario, the fixed jamming
nodes can still transmit jamming signals to create interference
at the eavesdropper. Instead of only one node, at least two
single-antenna jamming nodes are required in order to enable
the jamming nodes to deliberately create different amounts of
interference at the eavesdropper and destination user.
Base 
Station
One carriage of public transportation vehicle 
(e.g. city train)
Cooperative 
Nodes
Power 
transfer 
Jamming 
channel
Jamming 
channel
Transmission 
channel
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channel
Power 
Station
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hBE hBD
hCD
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Fig. 1. System model
Besides those two fixed cooperative nodes, the mobile users
who are also passengers in the vehicle can participate as
mobile cooperative jamming nodes. These mobile users are
potentially excellent jamming helpers because they may locate
close to the eavesdropper. For example, in peak hours, a
number of mobile users in the same vehicle can be used to
greatly interfere with the eavesdropper such that to improve the
secrecy performance. We note that, when these mobile users
perform cooperative jamming, they consume the limited en-
ergy of their batteries. Compensation or incentive mechanism
should be introduced for these helpers. As such, in this work
we consider that a power station is available to transfer power
to the cooperative jamming nodes. In addition, we assume
that when each cooperative node transmits jamming signal, its
transmit power should not exceed the power received from the
power station.
The information signal vector transmitted from the BS and
the jamming signal vector transmitted from the cooperative
nodes are denoted by vx ∈ CM×1 and z ∈ CN×1 respectively,
where v is beamforming vector adopted by the BS, x repre-
sents the confidential information signal for the destination
user with E[xHx] = 1. Then the received signals at the
destination user and the eavesdropper can be expressed as
yd = h
H
BDvx+ h
H
CDz+ nd, (1)
and
ye = h
H
BEvx+ h
H
CEz+ ne, (2)
respectively, where the vectors hBD ∈ CM×1 and hBE ∈
CM×1 denote the transmission channel and wiretap channel re-
spectively, while the vectors hCD ∈ CN×1 and hCE ∈ CN×1
denote the jamming channels from the N cooperative nodes
to the destination user and the eavesdropper, respectively. In
this work, we assume that all the channel state information is
available for designing the secure system. The assumption that
the eavesdropper’s channel state information is available can
be justified by the fact that the eavesdropper can be a potential
legitimate user and thus it has already cooperated with the BS
to conduct channel estimation in order to potentially receive
information from the BS. In (1) and (2), nd and ne represent
the Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance
σ2, at the destination and eavesdropper, respectively, while
z is the zero-mean Gaussian artificial noise (AN) vector with
covariance matrix Q, i.e., E[zzH ] = Q and Q  0.
We denote the maximum transmit power of the BS as PBS
and then we have
E(|vx|2) = v2 ≤ PBS . (3)
As assumed, the transmit power of each cooperative node is
no more than its harvested power from the power station, i.e.,
eTi Qei ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, ..., N. (4)
where Pi is the harvested power of i-th cooperative node,
while ei is a column vector in which the i-th element is 1 and
all other elements are all 0’s. Following (1), the achievable
rate from the BS to the destination is given by
Rd = log
(
1 +
|hBDHv|2
hCD
HQhCD + σ2
)
. (5)
4Likewise, following (2) the achievable rate from the BS to the
eavesdropper is given by
Re = log
(
1 +
|hBEHv|2
hCE
HQhCE + σ2
)
. (6)
Then, the achievable SR is given by Rs = max{0, Rd−Re}.
In this work, a positive SR can be guaranteed due to the known
CSI in the considered system model. For example, the BS can
transmit the confidential information in the null space of the
eavesdropper’s channel to guarantee Re = 0 and Rd > 0 such
that Rs > 0. As such, in this work the achievable SR can be
directly written as Rs = Rd−Re. As such, following (5) and
(6) the achievable SR as a function of v and Q is given by
Rs(v,Q) = log
(
1 +
|hBDHv|2
hCD
HQhCD + σ2
)
− log
(
1 +
|hBEHv|2
hCE
HQhCE + σ2
)
. (7)
With the aid of the cooperative nodes, the ultimate goal
of the BS is to maximize Rs(v,Q) subject to the power
constraints at the BS and the cooperative nodes or to minimize
some power consumption while guaranteeing a certain level of
SR. In the following section, we will tackle the optimization
of v and Q in order to achieve these ultimate goals.
III. PROPOSED JOINT DESIGN OF SECURE BEAMFORMING
AND COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In this section, we joint design the beamforming vector at
the BS (i.e., v) and the covariance matrix of the transmitted
AN at the cooperative nodes (i.e., Q) in order to achieve
different goals of the BS. Specifically, we first propose the
B-CJ-SRM scheme to maximize the achievable SR Rs(v,Q)
subject to the power constraints at the BS and the cooperative
nodes. In addition, we propose the B-CJ-TPM scheme to
minimize the power consumption at the BS while guaranteeing
Rs(v,Q) ≥ R0s , where R0s is the minimum required value of
Rs(v,Q).
A. Proposed B-CJ-SRM
Originally, our objective is to maximize the SR Rs(v,Q)
given in (7) subject to the power constraints at the BS and
the cooperative nodes. However, as per (7) we can see that
maximizing the achievable SR is to maximize a product
of two correlated and generalized eigenvectors, which is a
challenging problem to solve. Although a linear search method
is employed to solve this kind of problem in [19], the entire
computation is quite complex, resulting in considerable energy
consumption. Nevertheless, a less complex solution is feasible
if the secure system has a requirement on the maximum SINR
of the eavesdropper. To achieve a certain level of secrecy, it is
rational to demand the SINR of the eavesdropper stay below
a certain value denoted as γe. Then a tractable solution can be
achieved by reforming the maximization of Rs(v,Q) into the
maximization of the destination’s SINR. So the optimization
problem is given by
max
v,Q
|hHBDv|2
hHCDQhCD + σ
2
s.t. |v|2 ≤ PBS ,
eTi Qei ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N,
|hHBEv|2
hHCEQhCE + σ
2
≤ γe,
Q  0.
(8)
Expanding the square terms in (8) and using V to denote vvH
(i.e., V = vvH ), the optimization problem given in (8) can
be rewritten as
max
V,Q
hHBDVhBD
hHCDQhCD + σ
2
s.t. Tr(V) ≤ PBS ,
eTi Qei ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N,
hHBEVhBE
hHCEQhCE + σ
2
≤ γe,
V  0,Q  0,
rank(V) = 1,
(9)
We note that rank(V) = 1 in (9) is a non-convex constraint.
For now, we remove this constraint and the optimization
problem given in (9) is given by
max
V,Q
hHBDVhBD
hHCDQhCD + σ
2
s.t. Tr(V) ≤ PBS ,
eTi Qei ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N
hHBEVhBE − γe(hHCEQhCE + σ2) ≤ 0,
V  0,Q  0.
(10)
We note that the objective function in (10) is quasi-convex,
while all other constraints are convex. Fortunately, we can
convert the objective function to a convex one by Charnes-
Cooper transformation [20]. Thus the optimization problem
given in (10) can be again rewritten as
max
V˜,Q˜,t
Tr(HBDV˜)
s.t. Tr(V˜) ≤ tPBS ,
Tr(eie
T
i Q˜) ≤ tPi , i = 1, 2, ..., N,
Tr(HBEV˜)− γe(Tr(HCEQ˜) + σ2t) ≤ 0,
Tr(HCDQ˜) + σ
2t = 1,
V˜  0, Q˜  0,
(11)
where t is a slack variable, V˜ = tV, Q˜ = tQ, HBD =
hBDh
H
BD, HCD = hCDh
H
CD, HBE = hBEh
H
BE , and
HCE = hCEh
H
CE .
Since (11) is a standard semidefinite programming (SDP)
problem, the optimal solution to it can be found by using
SDP solvers such as CVX tools. If the optimal solution of
(11) is (V˜∗, Q˜∗, t∗), then the optimal solution of (10) is
(V∗ = V˜∗/t∗,Q∗ = Q˜∗/t∗) [21], [22]. If the rank ofV∗ is 1,
5V∗ can be written as V∗ = v∗v∗H based on the eigenvalue
decomposition. Therefore, the original optimization problem
given in (8) is solved and its optimal solution is (v∗,Q∗). We
recall that when we transfer the optimization problem (9) into
(10), the constraint rank(V) = 1 is removed. As such, in order
to prove that the solution to (10) can offer the solution to (9),
we only have to prove rank(V∗) = 1. This proof is detailed in
Appendix A. Then, the procedure of B-CJ-SRM scheme can
be summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Proposed B-CJ-SRM Scheme
Input: PBS , Pi, γe, N , M and σ
2.
1. Denote HBD as hBDh
H
BD, HCD as hCDh
H
CD, HBE as
hBEh
H
BE and HCE as hCEh
H
CE .
2. Solve the SDP problem (11) and obtain the optimal
solution to (11) as (V˜∗, Q˜∗, t∗)
3. Obtain the optimal solution to (10) as (V∗ =
V˜∗/t∗,Q∗ = Q˜∗/t∗).
4. Obtain v∗ by performing the eigenvalue decomposition
of V∗.
Output: v∗, Q∗.
B. Proposed B-CJ-TPM
In previous subsection, the SR is maximized with transmit
power constraint, i.e., the transmit power of the BS cannot
exceed a threshold PBS . In that case, to obtain the optimal
SR, the actual transmit power of the BS always reaches PBS .
However, green communication systems are sensitive to energy
consumption. Reducing the transmit power of the BS has
considerable importance to green communication, because the
BS usually consume much more energy than other nodes in
the network. To fulfill the coverage, the transmit power of the
BS can reach as high as dozens of watts, while the cooperative
nodes transmit with much lower power. So how to minimize
the transmit power of the BS becomes an important issue. In
this subsection, the system is designed with the objective of
transmit power minimization with SR constraint, i.e., the SR
cannot go below a threshold R0s . So the problem of transmit
power minimization can be formulated as
min
v,Q
|v|2
s.t. Rs(v,Q) ≥ R0s
eTi Qei ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N
Q  0.
(12)
Similar to the objective function in (8), the SR constraint
in (12) is also intractable to deal with. To simplify the SR
constraint, we replace it with two thresholds which separately
limit the destination’s and the eavesdropper’s SINRs. Then
(12) can be reformulated as
min
v,Q
|v|2
s.t.
|hHBDv|2
hHCDQhCD + σ
2
≥ γd
|hHBEv|2
hHCEQhCE + σ
2
≤ γe
eTi Qei ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N
Q  0.
(13)
The relationship between R0s and (γd, γe) is R
0
s = log(1 +
γd) − log(1 + γe) .Thus γd in (13) can be expressed as a
function of R0s and γe. Expanding the square terms in (13)
and defining V as vvH , we can turn the problem (13) to
min
V,Q
Tr(V)
s.t.
hHBDVhBD
hHCDQhCD + σ
2
≥ γd
hHBEVhBE
hHCEQhCE + σ
2
≤ γe
eTi Qei ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N
V  0,Q  0
rank(V) = 1.
(14)
The constraint rank(V) = 1 is non-convex, but in fact it
can be removed (proof can be found in Appendix B). Without
this rank constraint, (14) can be rewritten as
min
V,Q
Tr(V)
s.t. γd(h
H
CDQhCD + σ
2)− hHBDVhBD ≤ 0
hHBEVhBE − γe(hHCEQhCE + σ2) ≤ 0
eTi Qei ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N
V  0,Q  0.
(15)
Defining HBD as hBDh
H
BD ,HCD as hCDh
H
CD, HBE as
hBEh
H
BE and HCD as hCEh
H
CE , we can transform (15) into
min
V,Q
Tr(V)
s.t. γd(Tr(HCDQ) + σ
2)− Tr(HBDV) ≤ 0
Tr(HBEV)− γe(Tr(HCEQ) + σ2) ≤ 0
Tr(eie
T
i Q) ≤ Pi , i = 1, 2, ..., N
V  0,Q  0.
(16)
Because the problem (16) is a standard SDP problem, its
optimal solution denoted as (V∗,Q∗) can be found by using
SDP solvers such as CVX tools. The rank of V∗ is proved to
be 1 in Appendix B, thus the rank one constraint in (14) can
be removed. Moreover, V∗ can be written as V∗ = v∗v∗H
through eigenvalue decomposition. Therefore the problem (13)
is solved and its optimal solution is (v∗,Q∗).
Finally the procedure of our proposed B-CJ-TPM scheme
can be summarized as follows.
6Algorithm 2 The Proposed B-CJ-TPM Scheme
Input: Pi, R
0
s , γe, N , M and σ
2.
1. Denote HBD as hBDh
H
BD, HCD as hCDh
H
CD, HBE as
hBEh
H
BE and HCE as hCEh
H
CE .
2. Solve the SDP problem (16) and obtain the optimal
solution (V˜∗, Q˜∗).
3. Obtain v∗ by performing eigenvalue decomposition for
V∗.
Output: v∗, Q∗.
C. Complexity Analysis
Since solving optimization problems is the major com-
ponent in all our proposed schemes, the complexity of our
schemes depends on the type of the optimization problems and
the methods to solve them. In the following, the complexity
will be analyzed according to the steps in the literature [23].
Our proposed B-CJ-SRM and B-CJ-TPM schemes are fi-
nally converted to SDP problems as (11) and (16), respectively.
As a result, they can both be solved by CVX software. The
solvers used by the CVX software, such as SDPT3, employ a
symmetric primal-dual interior-point method. The complexity
of this method is derived in [23] as
O
((
1 +
J∑
j=1
kj
) 1
2
(
n3 + n2
J∑
j=1
k2j + n
J∑
j=1
k3j
)
log
(1
ǫ
))
,
(17)
where ǫ represents a tolerable error or computational accuracy.
kj , J and n denote the dimension of the j-th constraint, the
number of constraints (one equality constraint is equivalent
to two inequality constraints), and the total dimensions of
all optimization variables, respectively, in an optimization
problem.
As for B-CJ-SRM scheme, its SDP optimization problem is
(11). Since J equals to the number of constraints in (11), we
have J = N + 6. Similarly, according to the aforementioned
definition, we can also derive k1 = k2 = k3 = ... = kN+4 =
1, kN+5 = M , kN+6 = N , n = M
2 + N2 + 1. In order
to differentiate the same n for other schemes, we name the
parameter n as n0 for B-CJ-SRM, i.e., n0 = n. Then, the
complexity of B-CJ-SRM is expressed as
Comp−B − CJ − SRM(ǫ) =
O
(√
M + 2N + 5 In
(1
ǫ
)
n0
(
n20 + n0(M
2 +N2 +N + 4)
+M3 +N3 +N + 4
))
.
(18)
Similarly, for B-CJ-TPM, since the corresponding SDP
optimization problem is (16), we have J = N + 4, k1 =
k2 = k3 = ... = kN+2 = 1, kN+3 = M , kN+4 = N ,
n = n1 = M
2 + N2. The complexity of B-CJ-TPM is
calculated as
Comp−B − CJ − TPM(ǫ) =
O
(√
M + 2N + 3 In
(1
ǫ
)
n1
(
n21 + n1(M
2 +N2 +N + 2)
+M3 +N3 +N + 2
))
.
(19)
GivenM , then it can be derived from (18) and (19) that both
the complexity of B-CJ-SRM and B-CJ-TPM is approximately
O(N6.5). Due to this high complexity, alternative schemes will
be investigated in the next section.
IV. PROPOSED LOW-COMPLEXITY SCHEMES
In the scenario of this article, due to the time-varying
characteristic of wireless channel, the BS should be able to
solve the aforementioned optimization problems as fast as
possible, so that the optimal beamforming vector and interfer-
ence covariance matrix can be renewed in time. Therefore, the
proposed schemes should not only keep good secrecy/power
performance, but also have low computation complexity. B-
CJ-SRM and B-CJ-TPM proposed in last section both have
relatively high computation complexity because in order to
obtain the optimal performance, rather than directly optimize
the beamforming vector v, the two schemes both optimize the
matrix V = vvH which has quadratic dimensions compared
with v. Therefore, the low complex schemes proposed in this
section will directly optimize v. These two schemes namely
LC-B-CJ-SRM and LC-B-CJ-TPM both employ concave con-
vex procedure (CCCP) iterative algorithm [24] to obtain the
sub-optimal solutions of the optimization problems in B-
CJ-SRM and B-CJ-TPM. The main ideas of two proposed
low-complexity schemes are illustrated as follows. Firstly,
if necessary, the optimization problem is transformed into
an equivalent difference of convex (DC) programming [25].
Then the CCCP-based iterative algorithm is used to solve the
DC programming. During each iteration of the CCCP-based
iterative algorithm, only one second-order cone programming
(SOCP) [26] is solved.
A. Proposed LC-B-CJ-SRM
The optimization problem (8) is a nonconvex problem
because of the nonconvexity of the objective function. Next
we first transform problem (8) into an equivalent DC pro-
gramming and then solve this DC programming by CCCP-
based iterative algorithm. At the first beginning, we rewrite
the interference signals transmitted by all cooperative nodes
as qz, where z is a random artificial noise with unit power,
i.e., E(zHz) = 1 and q = [q1, q2, . . . , qN ]
T is a weight vector,
in which qi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) denotes the weight for the ith
cooperative node. Then we reformulate problem (8) as
max
v,q
vHAv
qHBq+ σ2
s.t.
vHCv
qHDq+ σ2
≤ γe
vHv ≤ PBS
ei
TqqHei ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
(20)
where A = hBDh
H
BD, B = hCDh
H
CD, C = hBEh
H
BE and
D = hCEh
H
CE .
7By introducing a slack variable t, we rewrite (20) as
max
v,q,t
t
s.t. qHBq+ σ2 − v
HAv
t
≤ 0
vHCv − γe(qHDq+ σ2) ≤ 0
vHv ≤ PBS
ei
TqqHei ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
t > 0.
(21)
It is noted that the functions such as t, vHAv, and vHAv/t
(t > 0, A  0) are convex [26]. Hence, problem (21) is
a DC programming. In the following, we will employ the
CCCP-based iteration algorithm to find a local optimum of
DC programming (21). Let
ζA(v, t) =
vHAv
t
, (22)
ψA(v) = v
HAv. (23)
According to the literature [27], the first-order Tayor expan-
sions of (22) and (23) around the point (v˜, t˜) are computed
as
ζA(v, t, v˜, t˜) =
2Re
{
v˜HAv
}
t˜
− v˜
HAv˜
t˜2
t, (24)
ψA(v, v˜) = 2Re
{
v˜HAv
}− v˜HAv˜. (25)
In the (n + 1)th iteration of the CCCP-based iterative algo-
rithm, we solve the following convex optimization problem:
max
v,q,t
t (26a)
s.t. qHBq+ σ2 − ζA(v, t, v˜(n), t˜(n)) ≤ 0 (26b)
vHCv − γe(ψD(q, q˜(n)) + σ2) ≤ 0 (26c)
vHv ≤ PBS (26d)
ei
TqqHei ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (26e)
t > 0. (26f)
where the point (v˜(n), q˜(n), t˜(n)) denotes the solution to
problem (26) at the nth iteration.
We will show that problem (26) can be further transformed
into a SOCP. By letting
a = − 2
t˜(n)
Av˜(n), (27)
b =
(
v˜(n)
)H
Av˜(n)(
t˜(n)
)2 , (28)
(26b) is rewritten as
qHBq+Re
{
aHv
}
+ bt+ σ2 ≤ 0 (29)
which can be converted into a second-order cone constraint,
i.e.,∥∥∥∥
[
2hHCDq
−Re{aHv} − bt− σ2 − 1
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ −Re{aHv}−bt−σ2+1.
(30)
Similarly, we can also convert (26c), (26d) and (26e) into
second-order cone constraints. Thus, problem (26) is converted
into the following SOCP:
max
v,q,t
t
s.t.∥∥∥∥
[
2hHCDq
−Re{aHv}−bt−σ2 −1
]∥∥∥∥≤ −Re{aHv}−bt−σ2 +1∥∥∥∥
[
2hHBEv
−Re{cHq}−d+ σ2 −γe
]∥∥∥∥ ≤−Re{cHq}−d+ σ2 +γe
‖v‖ ≤
√
PBS ,
∥∥eiTq∥∥ ≤ √Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t > 0,
(31)
where
c = −2Dq˜(n), (32)
d =
(
q˜(n)
)H
Dq˜(n). (33)
Denoting θ1 as the iteration convergence threshold, we
summarize the proposed LC-B-CJ-SRM scheme as Algorithm
3.
Algorithm 3 The Proposed LC-B-CJ-SRM Scheme
Initialization:
1) Given PBS , Pi, γe, N , M , σ
2 and θ1;
2) Denote A as hBDh
H
BD, B as hCDh
H
CD, C as hBEh
H
BE
and D as hCEh
H
CE ;
3) n = 0, (v˜(n), q˜(n), t˜(n)) = (v0,q0, t0);
Repeat:
1) Solve the problem (31) with (v˜(n), q˜(n), t˜(n)) and obtain
the current optimal solution (v∗,q∗, t∗);
2) Update (v˜(n+1), q˜(n+1), t˜(n+1)) = (v∗,q∗, t∗), n := n+
1;
3) Compute |t˜(n+1) − t˜(n)|;
Until: |t˜(n+1) − t˜(n)| < θ1;
Return: The local optimal solution of the problem (20)
(v∗,q∗).
B. Proposed LC-B-CJ-TPM
For the optimization problem (13), we first transform it into
an equivalent DC programming
min
v,q
‖v‖2 (34a)
s.t. qHBq+ σ2 − 1
γd
vHAv ≤ 0 (34b)
vHCv − γe(qHDq+ σ2) ≤ 0 (34c)
ei
TqqHei ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (34d)
In the following, the CCCP-based iteration algorithm will
be used to solve the DC programming (34). According to
(23) and (25), we derive the (n+1)th iteration of the CCCP-
8based iterative algorithm to solving the following optimization
problem:
min
v,q
‖v‖2 (35a)
s.t. qHBq+ σ2 − 1
γd
ψA(v, v˜
(n)) ≤ 0 (35b)
vHCv − γe(ψD(q, q˜(n)) + σ2) ≤ 0 (35c)
ei
TqqHei ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (35d)
Similarly, problem (35) can also be further converted to a
SOCP. Since both (35b) and (35c) can be written as second-
order cone constraint, therefore, problem (35) is equivalent to
min
v,q
‖v‖2
s.t.∥∥∥∥
[
2hHCDq
− 1
γd
Re
{
a1
Hv
}−b1 −1
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ − 1γd Re
{
a1
Hv
} −b1 +1∥∥∥∥
[
2hHCEv
−Re{cHq}−d1 − γe
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ −Re{cHq}−d1 + γe∥∥eiTq∥∥ ≤√Pi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
(36)
where
a1 = −2Av˜(n), (37)
b1 =
1
γd
(
v˜(n)
)H
Av˜(n) + σ2, (38)
d1 =
(
q˜(n)
)H
Dq˜(n) − σ2. (39)
Denoting θ2 as the iteration convergence threshold, we
summarize the proposed LC-B-CJ-TPM scheme as Algorithm
4.
Algorithm 4 The Proposed LC-B-CJ-TPM Scheme
Initialization:
1) Given Pi, R
0
s , γe, N , M , σ
2 and θ2;
2) Denote A as hBDh
H
BD, B as hCDh
H
CD, C as hBEh
H
BE
and D as hCEh
H
CE ;
3) n = 0, (v˜(n), q˜(n), ) = (v0,q0);
Repeat:
1) Solve the problem (36) with (v˜(n), q˜(n)) and obtain the
current optimal solution (v∗,q∗);
2) Update (v˜(n+1), q˜(n+1), ) = (v∗,q∗), n := n+ 1;
3) Compute |10lg(‖v˜(n+1)‖2)− 10lg(‖v˜(n)‖2)|;
Until: |10lg(‖v˜(n+1)‖2)− 10lg(‖v˜(n)‖2)| < θ2.
Return: The local optimal solution of the problem (34)
(v∗,q∗).
C. Complexity Analysis
Similar to the complexity analysis for B-CJ-SRM in Sec-
tion III, since the LC-B-CJ-SRM focuses on solving SOCP
problem (31), its complexity is calculated as follows. In the
problem (31), the number of LMI constraints is J = N + 4,
each LMI has a dimension of 1, i.e., k1 = k2 = k3 =
. . . = kN+4 = 1, and the total dimensions of all optimization
variables n = n2 = M + N + 1. According to the formula
(17), the complexity of the LC-B-CJ-SRM is expressed as
O
(√
N + 5 In
(1
ǫ
)
n2
(
n22 + n2(N + 4) +N + 4
)) · Imax,
(40)
where Imax is the maximum number of iteration times.
Similarly, for LC-B-CJ-TPM, according to its corresponding
SOCP optimization problem (36), we have J = N + 2, k1 =
k2 = k3 = . . . = kN+2 = 1, n = n3 = M + N . The
complexity of LC-B-CJ-TPM is calculated as
O
(√
N + 2 In
(1
ǫ
)
n3
(
n23 + n2(N + 2) +N + 2
)) · Imax.
(41)
Given M , then it can be derived from (40) and (41) that
both the complexity of LC-B-CJ-SRM and LC-B-CJ-TPM is
approximately O(N3.5). Comparing (18) with (40), we can
observe that the LC-B-CJ-SRM has a much lower complexity
than the B-CJ-SRM scheme. The same result can be found
between LC-B-CJ-TPM and B-CJ-TPM.
V. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we simulate six wireless powered PHY
security schemes and evaluate their performance. These six
schemes are our proposed two optimal schemes (B-CJ-SRM
and B-CJ-TPM), our proposed two low-complexity schemes
(LC-B-CJ-SRM and LC-B-CJ-TPM), zero-forcing scheme [8]
and QoSD scheme [18]. The performance of these schemes
will be compared and evaluated in terms of SR as well as
transmit power of the BS.
As the simulation scenario, one destination user and one
eavesdropper locate in one carriage of city train which drives
with a velocity of 60km/h. The distance between the BS and
the city train is 400m. The transmit power of the BS ranges
from 30dBm to 50dBm. The channel between the BS and the
train is assumed to follow Rice distribution, while the channel
between any two nodes in the city train is assumed to follow
Rayleigh distribution due to the multi-path effect inside city
train. The noise is assumed to follow a complex Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and variance 10−5. Two iteration
convergence thresholds θ1 and θ2 are 0.01 and 1 respectively.
Fig. 2 shows how the SRs of the aforementioned schemes
change with the transmit power of the BS. In the simulation,
the BS is equipped with 8 antennas, the number of cooper-
ative nodes is assumed to be 4 (including 2 fixed jamming
nodes), while the power harvested by each cooperative node
is assumed to be 2.5mW. From this figure, we can observe
that when the transmit power of the BS increases, the SR
of each scheme also increases. The reason is explained as
follows. According to the formula (7), the SR is determined
by the destination’s SINR and the eavesdropper’s SINR. As
the transmit power of the BS increases, both SINRs become
larger (note that the power harvested by each cooperative user
remains unchanged as well as the power of received interfer-
ence signals at the destination and eavesdropper). Meanwhile,
the destination’s SINR increases more than the eavesdropper’s
SINR, because essentially the optimization problems of the
aforementioned schemes all make the efforts to limit the
eavesdropper’s SINR.
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It can also be observed that our proposed low-complexity
scheme has similar performance to our proposed B-CJ-SRM
scheme. Moreover, our B-CJ-SRM scheme always outper-
forms the zero-forcing method and in the case of high transmit
power (more than 36dBm) also outperforms the QoSD method.
The performance gap enlarges with the increase of transmit
power. The reason is explained as follows. Our method is to
obtain the maximum SINR of the destination, but the zero-
forcing method and the QoSD method cannot achieve this,
because they only force the interference to the destination to
zero or set a minimum threshold for the destination’s SINR.
These two constraints have limited impact on the growth
of the destination’s SINR, especially when the BS transmits
secure information with a high power. Although the zero-
forcing method and the QoSD method aim to minimize the
eavesdropper’s SINR, compared with the destination’s SINR,
the eavesdropper’s SINR is so small that its reduction can
be neglected. From the above anlaysis, we can see that our
method has better SR than the other two methods and this
advantage becomes wilder when the transmit power increases.
When the transmit power of the BS is small (less than
36dBm), although our method has a slightly higher SR than
the zero-forcing method, it performs worse than the QoSD
method. The reason is that the QoSD method set a minimum
required SINR for the destination in the constraint which
guarantees a relatively good SR in case of low transmit power
of the BS.
Fig. 3 shows that the SRs of the aforementioned schemes
increase with the number of cooperative nodes. The transmit
power of the BS is set to 10W. The reason is explained as
follows. With more cooperative nodes, more interference the
eavesdropper will suffer. In addition, the transmit power of the
BS remains the same. So the eavesdropper’s SINR becomes
smaller. Meanwhile, the destination’s SINR experiences very
little or even no degradation because the aforementioned
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schemes all have restrict requirement on the destination’s
SINR. For example, our proposed B-CJ-SRM and its low-
complexity version both aim to maximize the destination’s
SINR, while the QoSD method has a minimum requirement on
the destination’s SINR. The zero-forcing method directly nulls
out the interference to the destination, resulting an unchanging
SINR of the destination. Due to a decreasing SINR of the
eavesdropper and a relatively stable SINR of the destination,
the SRs of the four schemes increase with the number of
cooperative nodes.
It can also be observed from Fig. 3, when the number of
cooperative nodes exceeds some value (such as 28), the SRs
of the four schemes become relativley steady. The reason
can be explained as follows. Due to so many cooperative
nodes, it is easy to generate great enough interference to the
eavesdropper, thus the eavesdropper’s SINR will become so
small that it approaches to zero. Meanwhile, with so many
cooperative nodes, the dimension of interference covariance
matrix is high, so it is easy to obtain the optimal interference
covariance matrix which can help null out the interference to
the destination, resulting in a stable SINR of the destination.
Since both SINRs of the destination and the eavesdropper are
relatively steady, the SRs of the aforementioned schemes also
keep stable when the number of cooperative nodes increases.
Fig. 4 shows how the SRs of the concerned schemes change
with the number of antennas at the BS. The number of
cooperative nodes is set to 4, while the transmit power of the
BS is 10W. As the number of antennas at the BS increase,
the SRs of our proposed two schemes also increases. The
reason is that, by designing the optimal beamforming vector,
our schemes can maximize the received power of the secret
signal at the desired user as well as the SINR of the desired
user. In addition, the SINR of the eavesdropper is limited to a
very low value which is much smaller than that of the desired
user. When the number of antennas at the BS increases, the
10
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beamforming vector has a higher dimension, so it will be easier
to design the beamforming vector to maximize the desired
user’s SINR, then the SR will increase.
From Fig. 4, we can also observe that the SR of the zero-
forcing method barely increases with the number of antennas
at the BS. The reason is explained as follows. The zero-forcing
method only needs to optimize the interference covariance
matrix so that the interference to the destination can be nulled
out and the interference to the eavesdropper is maximized.
Thus there is even no beamforming vector in the optimization
problem of the zero-forcing method. Therefore, the increase
of the number of antennas at the BS has no significant effect
on the performance of the zero-forcing method.
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Fig. 5 shows how the SRs of the four schemes change with
the harvested power of each cooperative node. For simplicity, it
is assumed that all cooperative nodes received the same power
from the power station. The number of cooperative nodes is
set to 4, the number of antennas at the BS is fixed as 8, and
the transmit power of the BS is 10W. It is observed that as
each cooperative node harvests more power from the power
station, the SRs of all four schemes get better. The reason is as
explained follows. Harvesting more energy, each cooperative
node is able to transmit the jamming signal in a higher
power, thus increasing the interference to the eavesdropper.
Meanwhile, the interference to the destination is effectively
limited to a very low level due to the optimization design of
the interference covariance matrix. In our proposed schemes,
the matrix is well designed to maximize the SINR of the
destination, while in zero-forcing scheme the interference to
the destination is even nulled out. From all above analysis,
it can be concluded that the SRs of the concerned schemes
increase with the harvested power of each cooperative node.
From Fig. 5, it can also be observed that when the harvest
power of cooperative nodes increases to some extent (more
than 8mw for example), the growth of the SRs becomes
very slow. The reason is that the relatively high transmit
power of interference signal from the cooperative nodes will
generate great interference to the eavesdropper, thus effectively
reducing the eavesdropper’s SINR to nearly 0. In addition, the
interference to the destination is limited through the optimiza-
tion design of the interference covariance matrix. Therefore
the SR will become relatively steady.
Fig. 6 shows how the transmit power of the BS changes
with the number of cooperative nodes. Here we investigate
the transmit power of the BS rather than the transmit power
of the cooperative nodes, because the former is much higher
(at least 1000 times more) than the latter. Thus the research on
the reduction of the transmit power of the BS is much more
important than the transmit power of cooperative nodes. The
number of antennas of the BS is set to 8, the power harvested
by each cooperative node is 2.5mW and the required minimum
SR is set to 2bits/s/Hz. From Fig. 6, it can be observed that
when there are no more than 12 cooperative nodes, the transmit
power of the BS decreases as the number of cooperative nodes
increases. The reason is explained as follows. For these four
methods, the desired SR is achieved by the collaboration of
the BS and the cooperative nodes. To bring forth the same
SR, if the cooperative nodes make more contribution, then the
BS can contribute less. In the simulation, when the number
of cooperative nodes increase, more cooperative nodes will
generate greater interference to the eavesdropper, thus having
a more positive impact on the desired SR. Meanwhile, in order
to keep the same SR, the BS has to reduce its power of secure
signal transmission.
It can also be observed from Fig. 6 that when the number
of cooperative nodes is relatively large (e.g., greater than 12),
the transmit powers of the BS of the four schemes tend to be
steady. The reason is that when there are enough cooperative
nodes, these nodes will generate considerable interference to
the eavesdropper, making the eavesdropper’s SINR approach
to zero. Meanwhile, with so many cooperative nodes, the
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dimension of the interference covariance matrix is high, thus
it is feasible to obtain the optimal matrix to almost null out the
interference to the destination. Then if at the same time the
transmit power of the BS is also kept unchanging, the SINR of
the destination as well as the SR will become relatively steady.
So in order to maintain the SR at 2 bits/s/Hz, the transmit
power of the BS will be kept steady.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates wireless powered cooperative jam-
ming technique to enhance energy-efficient security for pub-
lic transportation. First, a CJ based secure communication
model with energy harvesting capability is established. By
employing both fixed jammers and mobile jammers to transmit
interference signals, the model can not only guarantee basic
secrecy performance in the worst-case scenario but also en-
deavour to greatly interfere with the eavesdropper to obtain
the best performance. In addition, to compensate mobile users
for their contributions on security, energy compensation is
provided in the model through energy harvesting technique.
Then to obtain the best secrecy and power performance, we
propose two CJ based schemes namely B-CJ-SRM and B-
CJ-TPM. The two schemes can maximize the SR (with the
transmit power constraint) and minimize the transmit power
of the BS (with SR constraint), respectively, by the design
of beamforming vector and interference covariance matrix. In
order to further reduce the complexity of our proposed optimal
schemes, we design a low-complexity versions namely LC-B-
CJ-SRM and LC-B-CJ-TPM. Simulation results show that our
proposed low-complexity schemes have similar performance
to our optimal schemes. Moreover, when the transmit power
of the BS is no less than 40dBm, our proposed schemes have
significantly better performance than existing zero-forcing and
QoSD methods. On the other hand, to achieve the same SR,
when there are only a few jammers, our schemes requires less
transmit power of the BS than the two existing methods.
APPENDIX A
Since the objective function and constraints in (11) are all
convex, the problem (11) meets Slater’s condition and Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [28]. The Lagrangian of (11)
is
L(V˜, Q˜, t, λ1, λ2, λ3, µi)
= Tr(HBDV˜) + λ1(Tr(V˜)− PBSt)+
N∑
i=1
µi(Tr(eie
T
i Q˜)− Pit) + λ2(Tr(HBEV˜)−
γe(Tr(HCEQ˜) + σ
2t)) + λ3(Tr(HCDQ˜) + σ
2t− 1)−
Tr(P1V˜)− Tr(P2Q˜).
(42)
where λ1, λ2, λ3,P1,P2 and µi(i = 1, 2, . . . , N ) are all dual
variables. The KKT conditions that are relevant to our proof
are listed as
∂L
∂V˜
∣∣∣∣
V˜=V˜∗
= HBD + λ1I+ λ2HBE −P1 = 0 (43)
P1V˜
∗ = 0 (44)
λ1(Tr(V˜
∗)− PBSt∗) = 0 (45)
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≤ 0 (46)
P1  0, V˜∗  0 (47)
where (45) is a complementary slackness constraint and is the
optimal solution.
Rearrange (43) and let both sides of it be multiplied by, we
can get the following formula
−λ2HBEV˜∗ = (λ1I+HBD)V˜∗. (48)
If λ1 can be 0, Tr(V˜
∗) − PBSt∗ in (45) can take any value,
which means that the source transmit power (denoted as
Tr(V˜∗)) does not definitively equal to the maximum value
PBS . Thus V˜
∗ in this condition is not the optimal solution.
Therefore λ1 cannot be equal to 0. Since λ1 > 0, the matrix
λ1I + HBD in (48) is a positive definite matrix and also a
full rank matrix. Then we perform the rank operation on both
sides of (48), i.e.,
rank(HBEV˜
∗) = rank(V˜∗). (49)
Since rank(HBE) = 1, we have
rank(V˜∗) = rank(HBEV˜
∗) ≤ min(rank(HBE), rank(V˜∗)),
(50)
so rank(V˜∗) can be 1 or 0. If rank(V˜∗) is 0, V∗ which
equals to v∗v∗H becomes an all-zero matrix, thus v∗ will be
an all-zero vector. In this case, there will be no signals trans-
mitted from BS, which is meaningless. Therefore, rank(V˜∗)
should be 1. Since V∗ equals to V˜∗/t and t∗ is a slack
variable, we can conclude that rank(V∗) equals to 1.
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APPENDIX B
The subjective function and constraints in (16) are all
convex, so the problem (16) meets Slater’s condition and
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The Lagrangian of
(16) is
L(V,Q, λ1, λ2, µr) =
Tr(V) + λ1(γd(Tr(HRDQ) + σ
2)− Tr(HBDV))
+ λ2(Tr(HBEV) − γe(Tr(HCEQ) + σ2))
+
N∑
r=1
µr(Tr(ere
T
r Q)− Pr)− Tr(P1V)− Tr(P2Q)
(51)
where λ1, λ2,P1,P2 and µr (r = 1, 2, . . . , N ) are all dual
variables. We only list the KKT conditions that are relevant
to our proof, i.e.,
∂L
∂V
∣∣∣∣
V=V∗
= I− λ1HBD + λ2HBE −P1 = 0 (52)
P1V
∗ = 0 (53)
P1  0,V∗  0 (54)
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0. (55)
Rearrange (52) and let both sides of it be multiplied by V∗,
we can have the following formula
λ1HBDV
∗ = (I+ λ2HBE)V
∗ (56)
If λ1 is 0, the left of (55) becomes 0, (I + λ2HBE)V
∗ then
will also become 0. Since (I + λ2HBE)V
∗ is a full rank
matrix, (I+λ2HBE)V
∗ can’t be a zero matrix, so V∗ has to
be 0, which means that there is no signals transmitted from
BS. This conflicts with the fact, so λ1 cannot be 0. From (55),
we can know that λ1 is greater than 0, so (I+λ2HBE)V
∗ in
(56) is a positive definite matrix and also a full rank matrix.
Then we perform rank operations on both sides of (56) and
we can have
rank(HBDV
∗) = rank(V∗). (57)
Since rank(HBD) = 1, then
rank(V∗) = rank(HBDV
∗) ≤ min(rank(HBD), rank(V∗)).
(58)
If rank(V∗) is 0, then V∗ is a zero matrix. Since V∗ is
equivalent to v∗v∗H, v∗ will become a zero vector, which con-
flicts with the fact of signal transmission. Therefore rank(V∗)
should be 1.
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